A linear game consists of two subsets of a vector space with a scalar product. The idea is that players 1 and 2 select, independently, elements of the first and second set, respectively. Then, player 2 has to pay to player 1 the value of the scalar product of the selected elements.
Introduction and related work
with (dij) a positive definite Ν χ Ν matrix which must be close to the identity matrix I.
is an example of a parameter set depending on a vector Χ = (XI,I2, •· · XN) ' with Xi > 0; i = 1,2, ... Ν and χ = Σ^χ». For this set it is shown by Stenger [8] that the ratio strategy is minimax in an asymptotic sense. Minimax strategies in the strict sense (of the present paper) are derived by Gabler and Stenger [4] for the set {yeR":
under the assumption χ close to 1, (dij) close to the identity matrix I.
Here 1 is a vector with all components equal to 1; 0 will be used in an analogous meaning. Note that the sets defined by (2), (3), (4), (5) , respectively, are of the form jj/eR" : y'i/y< lj with a matrix U satisfying Ul = 0 in cases (2), (3) and Ux = 0 in cases (4) and (5) . In the present paper, more generally, a full rank Ν χ Κ matrix Χ, Ν > Κ > 1, and a symmetric non-negative definite Ν χ Ν matrix U of rank Ν -Κ are considered with X'U = 0 defining the parameter set 6 = {|/€R" :^Uy<l}. Let the k-ih column of X consist of zeros and ones, ones for the components belonging to the fc-th stratum. Since
is a quadratic form in y, θ can be expressed as
where U is a block diagonal matrix satisfying X'U = 0.
We want to mention that in this example the minimax strategy for the total y with respect to θ is given by proportional allocation of the sample size to the strata, simple random sampling in each stratum and Ν times the sample mean as estimator.
In section 2 parameter sets of the type θ = {y € : y'Uy <1} are motivated with reference to superpopulation models, in section 3 the class of representative strategies which is of special importance is introduced. In section 4 the existence of a minimax strategy is shown to be a consequence of the existence of an equilibrium point for a special type of linear games. In the appendix the existence of this equilibrium point is established.
Superpopulation models
The selection of a strategy will be based on prior information. 
E{a,'Y-YY) =0
is equivalent to X'(a,-1)=Q.
Assuming (7) var
is minimized by the well known best linear unbiased (BLU) regression predictor. However, usually the model Μ(Ω), called superpopulation model, is not reliable in a strict sense and, therefore, the use of standard regression predictors is not justified. The strategy (ρ, a) to be used should perform well in u small neighbourhoods" of L = {Xß :
Let ε, in addition to the earlier assumptions, be normally distributed with Ω regular. Then, the logarithm of the density function of Y is a linear function of
and a natural distance between y and L is defined by min fa-XßYn^fa-Xß) which by standard methods is shown to equal
with U non-negative definite and of rank Ν -Κ satisfying X'U = 0. This is a strong motivation for a discussion of parameter sets (6).
Representative strategies
Obviously, for all s with p, > 0. A strategy with this property is called representative with respect to X (see Hajek [5] ). Hence a minimax strategy in the sense of (1) has to be representative with respect to X.
Note that the representativity of (p, a) is equivalent to the unbiasedness of a^Y for all s with p s > 0 in the superpopulation model (see (7)).
Linear games
We have (see section 3) MSE(j/; p, a) = y'Gy = tryy'G where G is the risk generating matrix of the strategy (ρ,α) and tr denotes the trace operator. Let be the convex hull of {y^-yee} and Αχ the set of all risk generating matrices of representative strategies.
y,Ax
are subsets of the linear space of symmetric Ν χ iV-matrices. In this space a scalar product is defined by tr VW where V and W are symmetric Ν χ TV-matrices. Hence,
(y,Ax)
with the scalar product tr is a linear game (Luenberger [6] ).
Theorem: For the linear game (y, Αχ) a value υ and matrices V€ y, * WE Αχ exist with tr VW< ν = tr VW< tr VW for all
V€y,WeA x . The proof of this theorem is given in the appendix. Here, we consider two consequences and assume (Ρ, a) to be a representative strategy with risk generating matrix (ii) For j ε θ and any, not necessarily representative, strategy (ρ, a)
MSE^y;P,a υ < supMSE(τ,ρ,α^ i.e. (Ρ,α) is minimax on θ in the usual sense of survey sampling (see (1)). If a statistician applies (Ρ,α), his risk MSE(y;P,a) is a function of y € θ and υ is an upper bound, in fact the lowest upper bound he can achieve by any strategy.
Appendix: Proof of the Theorem
Subsequently, we reduce the set y in (y, Αχ) without changing strategic aspects of the game. Then, we derive lemmata needed in the proof which, essentially, is an application of the Theorem of separating hyperplanes (see e.g. Luenberger [6] where Αχ is the convex hull of Αχ. Note that the set Αχ is introduced for technical reasons, while the set Αχ which is not convex is of primary interest.
By Qo the Loewner ordering (see e.g. [7] , p.462) is defined on Q. Assume This order relation differs from the relation usually considered in statistical decision theory which is defined by the cone of all vectors (matrices, in our case) with non-negative components.
Lemma 1: Let P,Q G Qo· Then trPQ > 0.
If, in addition, Q € Qo with Q hQ, then
tr PQ > tr PQ.
Proof: Since Q is non-negative definite, there exists an orthogonal basis of eigenvectors (z 1 ,... ,z N ) with respect to the eigenvalues 0 < Αχ... < λ^· Then Q = Σ, t=l and
The second inequality of the Lemma is a direct consequence of tr P{Q-Q) > 0. is non-negative. There exists a hyperplane, defined by Q 6 Q\{0} and k €R, separating the interior of U^ (relative to Q) and Αχ , i.e.
(Q, R)<k for all ReU^ (8) (Q,W)>k for all W € Αχ (9) k = sup (Q,R). Hence, (v, W) is an equilibrium point of the linear game ^χ,Αχ) of which the value is given by ν := (V, W)· ο
